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THE HUMAN STRIVLXG AND THE
CATEGORIES OF SCIENCE'
BY BENJAMIN GINZBURG
A CERTAIN school of philosophers have tried to persuade usthat the human striving, or the moral consciousness, and the
principles of scientific reason have no relationship in common. It
is but necessary to cast a glance at the history of pragmatism to
appreciate the inadequacy of such an assertion. In the original arti-
cle of C. S. Peirce on "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," - the argu-
ment concerned the principles of scientific method. After review-
ing the notions of Bacon and Descartes, as well as the attempts of
lesser philosophers to legislate for science, the American mathemati-
cian came to the conclusion that it was necessary to bring reason
into the laboratory—much as Kepler had done when he painstak-
ingly plotted every possible curve that could explain the movement
of Mars. From a discussion of the logic of science, pragmatism w^as
transformed into a philosophy of voluntaristic fideism. And even
if Mr. Dewey has attempted to swing the movement away from some
of the temperamental excesses of James, the fact remains that in the
pragmatic philosophy logic and moral striving are still very closely
united.
To be sure, the realistic critics have used pragmatism as the hoi
rible example of what happens when reasons of the heart are allowed
to interfere with reasons of the intellect. And it certainly is true
that pragmatism in many instances has weakened the authority of
the intellect, and has opened the door to all manner of affective
vagaries. The same charge is applicable to the Bergsonian phil-
osophy of the intuition, which beginning as a critique of scientific
orthodoxy has ended up as an apology for modernistic Catholicism.
Granted that these movements have been to a large extent intel-
i.A. critical discussion based on L'Experience Humainc et la Causalitc
Physique, by Leon Brunschvicg. Paris, Alcan, 1922, pp. 625, xvi.
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lectually destructive, the very fact tliat the moral consciousness can
play such tricks is in itself highly significant. We must deal with
the reasons of the heart if only for their power to make trouble.
We cannot follow out the suggestion that Mr. Russell offers in "The
Freeman's Worship."' and let otir heart cherish lofty thoughts with
no other specific content than their mere loftiness. The heart refuses
to be fooled that way.
If the moral striving cannot be permanently separated from our
intellectual activity, and if the method of pragmatism and the method
of the Bergsonian intuition lead only to the l)reakdo\vn of intellectual
authority, there is yet the method of Spinoza—the union of love and
knowledge in the anwr del intcUcctitaUs. It is also the method of
Plato and the method of Kant. All three of these i)hilosoi)hcrs edu-
cated their sensibility by a devotion to science, instead of undermin-
ing their reason by giving free rein to their sensibility. All three
meditated the experience of mathematics. "... Truth." wrote
Spinoza, "might have lain hidden from the hun.an race through all
eternity, had not Mathematics, which deals not in final causes but
in the essences and properties of things, oft'ered to men another [and
veritable] norm of truth." "
^^"hat clearer illustration can be given of the gulf separating the
Spinozistic norm of truth from the norm of pragmatism than to cite
in this connection the lines written in 1893 by William James to his
friend Flournoy?
"Pourcjuoi suis-je depourvu du sens mathcmati(|ue. Toutes les
propositions mathematiques me semblent non seulement inintelligi-
bles. mai.-< fausscs. Renouvier m'a toujours contente par son exposi-
tion : et voila qu'il va falloir que je me remette a I'ecole." *
AMiile these lines are not meant to be taken too seriously, they
do give an aperQU of the motivation of the Jamesian temperameni
.
and M. Bnmschvicg is right in observing that "the J'arieties of Reli-
gious Experience would bear quite a different interpretation the
moment one understood that there exists Varieties of Mathematical
Experience, no less fascinating and no less suggestive.
"
''
For the task of interj^reting the human striving in its multiple
philosophic aspects, no writer could be better fitted than M. Rrun-
schvicg. Historian of Spinoza, commentator of Pascal, equipped
with the solid weapon of mathematical training as displayed in his
-"Popular Science Monthly," Dec, 1877.
•'' F^thics, Part I, app. Cf. Van VIotcn and Land. vol. 1, p. 71.
*La J'ic ct I'Oeuvi'c dc Theodore flounwv, Archives dc Psvchologie, 1921,
p. 95.
^L'Expi-r. Hum., p. xi.
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Etapes de la Philosophic MatJicniatiqiie. and nurtured in an intel-
lectual atmosphere where science and philosophy have been brought
more and more together—our author has used all these advantages
to perform a difficult piece of work well. He has employed a method
which might be characterized as historical impressionism. Certainly
no method is more open to abuse than that of arriving at a point
of view by reading and commenting upon history. The danger of
reading into history one's own preconceptions is assuredly very
great, but its magnitude is in inverse proportion to the erudition of
the historian. In the case of AI. Brunschvicg. while his present
work, L'Experience Humainc ct la Causalitc PJixsiqitc. is not to be
ranked, and is not meant to be ranked as a historv, it would seem
that he has lived up, as well as any man can, to the ambitious for-
mula he himself has set for all his writing:
"Philosophy will know what men have believed, and why they
have believed in it ; it will say why there are certain propositions
which it is absurd to maintain in this day, others which it would be
no less absurd not to maintain. Philosophy will sum up the experi-
ence of thinking humanity, and this experience must be made com-
plete by a test of truth, which will bring about discrimination be-
tween values, which will eliminate diversity ynd contradictions,
allowing to remain only the unique truth." -'
M. Brunschvicg's subject is at the heart of the modern philo-
sophic problem— one might say the philosophic problem of
all time. It is not merely a cold intellectual antinomy
—
the logical absurdity of the causal relation — that concerns
us. It is the validity of science, the efficacity of human effort
which are at stake. The crucial issues upon \vhich turned the war-
fare between religion and science in the seventeenth century and
between science and moral philosophy in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries embrace this central paradox of causality. It is easy
enough to take one side or another in the battle—to be a dogmatic
scientific determinist and forget the troubles of the moral life, or to
believe in faith and deny the necessity of science. But even when
human experience is thus artificially divided into water-tight com-
partments, new difficulties rise up in each section. The orthodox
principles of science lead to logical contradictions at every step. And
as for faith, it cannot get along by itself ; it demands a concrete intel-
lectual creed, and even apologetics must obey the rules of logical
consistency.
For the solution of these multiple contradictions, there is no gen-
uine method other than the method of science and philosophy. This
'^Nature et Liberie, Paris, Flammarion, 1921, p. x.
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lesson M. Brunschvicg has learned by a confrontation of the intel-
lectual careers of Pascal and Spinoza, and it was at the conclusion
of his studies on these philosoi)hers. published in 1906, that he thus
summed up the relation of reason to faith
:
"Reason is not an element of a synthesis which is to be estab-
lished by a conij)romise between reason and faith : it is the positive
function of the synthesis, while the role of faith is to occupy the
place of anticipation which reason is to reach, to provoke the effort
which will make this reason equal to its own task."^
M. Brunschvicg's motive in writing his comprehensive treatise
on causality is obvious to the reader who cares to look between the
lines. It is to banish the ghost of scientific materialism which haunts
our modern civilization. Rut the knowledge of this motive does not
in any way diminish the philosophic value of the work—no more
than a knowledge of Spinoza's psychology destroys the logical con-
sistency of the Ethics.
Nearly a hundred pages are devoted to a consideration of the
doctrines of pure empiricism. These theories, bobbing up now and
then in the course of history, have pretended to explain the organi-
zation of experience automatically without any intellectual effort or
contribution on tlie part of the human mind. Perhaps the most
blatant exposition of empiricism is that of John Stuart Mill, who
tried to derive the principles of induction by induction itself. The
ancient empiricists were never so ambitious. Thus Sextus Empiricus
writes in the Advcrsiis Mathouaticos iW 104): "If in medicin.-
we know that a lesion of the heart brings on death, it is not through
a single observation, but because after having observed the death
of Dion, we see the death of Theon. Socrates, and many others." *
In other words, empiricism was merely an upper limit to scepticism.
The case was different with Hume. Here we have a philosopher
who oscillated between extreme scepticism and extreme credulity.
After having challenged the efficacy of natural causality to such a
point as to destroy all miity in experience, he good-naturedly re-
established a happy ending in his philosophy bv bringing in the dcus
ex mochina of universal attraction or association—an extension by
analogy of Newtonian gravitation. In his historical judgment on
Hume. M. Brunschvicg follows the idealistic tradition according to
which the Scotch philosopher is important not for himself as for
his relation to Kant.
Turning to the intellectual or rationalistic organization of expe-
riences, M. Brunschvicg discusses the various sr.ccessive phases in
^Revue de Metanhysique et de Mdrale. XI\', 1906. p. 731.
* Cited hy Rninschvicg, p. 5.
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the development of the doctrine of cansaHty. One section deals with
the notions of causality among primitive peoples, and the author
takes the occasion to demolish the positivistic interpretation of M.
Levy-Bruhl that the savage mentality is pre-logical. Relying upon
the same documentation as the sociological school, M. Brunschvicg
is able to show that what the savage mind lacks, just as what the
mediaeval mind lacked when it asserted that nature abhors a vacuum,
is the mathematical tool by which modern physics and the chemistry
of Lavoisier have built up fixed equations to support the observations
of the senses. The savage mind is then pre-scientific but not neces-
sarily pre-logical.
It is in dealing with ancient philosophy that M. Brunschvicg's
historical interpretation is put to a severe test. The responsibility
for the Aristotelian finalism, Avhich dominated the Western world
for twenty centuries, is traced to the failure of Plato's mathemati-
cal philosophy. The issue of mechanism vs. finalism was already
there Avhen Aristotle came on the scene. The naturalists had devel-
oped mechanism, but this philosophy proved fruitless for the reason
that the ancients lacked the instrument of calculation which alone
has made modern science successful. Finalism had grown out of
the practical moral philosophy. Plato saw the weakness of both
alternatives, and tried to find a way out by the path that Pythagoras
had traced, but, finding himself unable to render account of change
and becoming by the eternal essences of either numbers or ideas, he
introduces the notion of the demi-urge as the ordinator of the uni-
verse. There was nothing left for Aristotle to do. but to register
the defeat of Plato, and to conciliate in eclectic fashion both finalism
and mechanism.
The Cartesian revolution is hailed by the author as a triumph
of mathematics over scholasticism. Its great virtue is that it geo-
metricised physics at the same time that it reduced geometry to
algebra. The essence of Cartesian rationalism is that it abandoned
the search for the real causes of mechanical action but set itself
the task of observing relations. This philosophic gain was com-
promised by the subsequent development of Newtonian physics with
its action at a distance.
"The hope which after Descartes the seventeenth century had
been able to form, that of finding in the mechanistic conception of
the universe a definitive solution of the problem of causality, was
not realized. Not only do we observe, with Leibnitz and with New-
ton, the return of that notion of force which seemed to have been
chased out of philosophy by the discredit of the scholastic tradition,
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but this revival comes about tbroui^'b two different ways, wbich lead
to two nations of force, incompatible eacli witb ibe otber. Tbe Leib-
nitzian notion of active force is rejjarded as imaginary by tbe New-
tonians, because it proceeds from a metaj^bysical speculation, tbe
truth of wbicb has not been submitted to a test of facts ; the New-
tonian or post-Xewtonian notion of force is regarded as imaginary
by the Leibnitzians because it does not satisfy the conditions of
spatial contact required by scientific comprehension. A double con-
flict has to be resolved by the eighteenth century : inside of rational
mechanics, the conflict of mechanism and d\namism between Car-
tesians and Leibnitzians : and on the other hand inside of dynamisnr?.
the conflict of metaphysical mathematicism and experimental mathe-
maticism." ^
Part of this conflict was. as we know, removed by Kant, and the
doctrine of the a-priori. Without renouncing in any way the Car-
tesian principle that for the speculative knowledge of the universe
there exists but one type of truth, that of mathematics, the Kantian
criticism bridged the gap between mathematics and physics by means
of the forms of the intuition. On the experimental side the prob-
lems set by the Xewtonian cosmology were not really solved until
the development of Einsteinian relativity. From his point of view-
as a critical idealist. M. Crunschvicg takes no pains to conceal the
jov with which he greets the new physics. The concept of energy
has long since been regarded as nothing more than a mathematical
integral, and now w-e are able at last to reduce gravity—this occult
force acting at a distance—to geometry and differential equations.
To be sure there still remain obstacles in the way of mathematical
idealism as a philosophy of science. There is the obstreperous quan-
tum theorv. which challenges the hypothesis of mathematical con-
tinuity. And there is the atomic hypothesis, which after its various
vicissitudes, has now gained new strength through the work of M.
Jean Perrin. P>ut even though the atom has been counted and meas-
ured, we have not yet reached the cosmological ultimate of Dem-
ocritus.
"The atoms," writes M. Perrin, "are not these eternal and indi-
visible elements whose irreduciljle simplicity would set a limit to the
possible, and. in their unimaginable smallness. we commence to
anticipate a prodigious swarming of new worlds. Thus the astron-
omer, with his head growing dizzy at the sight, discovers beyond
the familiar skies, beyond the abysses of shadow that light takes
milleniums to traverse^ pale flakes lost in space, milky ways, immeas-
i^rabiy distant, whose feeble glimmer yet reveals to us the palpitation
'•/hid., p. 251.
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of millions of giant stars. Nature employs the same limitless splen-
dor both in the Atom and in the Xebnlus, and every new instrument
of knowledge shows her to be more vast and variegated, more
fecond, more unexpected, more beautiful, more rich in its fathom-
less immensity." ^^
It is against the background of modern mathematical physics that
M. Brunschvicg paints his personal philosophy Shunning meta-
physics, he is content with a philosophy of human experience, a phil-
osophy whose sole aim is to reflect upon the progress of thought
with a view to dispel prejudices and to face the future with a con-
fidence of an understanding of the past.
"The comprehension of scientific knowledge demands an effort
of reflexion upon the perspective according to wliich the spirit dis-
poses both the notions which will be the instnmient of its conquest
and the data through which experience answers its questions, upon
the manner in which the adaptation of the measure to the thing
measured permits of establishing a connection and harmony between
the notions of rational order and the facts of the experimental order
And we shall grasp the secret of this perspective only if we know
how to plunge ourselves into the remote past of history, if we see
how, by the elan of invention and by the unexpected reaction of
observation, have been developed, crystalized, and then broken, the
notions which serve to put the problem of the universe into equa-
tions, how the methods have been remodeled, and refined in order
to give the means for perfectioning endlessly the approximation of
the solutions already attained." ^^
The philosophy of M. Brunschvicg opposes itself with equal
rigor both to the conceptualism of classic rationalism and to the
modern anti-intellectualism. From Lachelier he has acquired the
doctrine that judgment is the ultimate term of human thought, and
from Emile Boutroux he has borrowed the idea of contingency in
the laws of nature. Out of such elements he has constructed a two-
fold philosophy of Socratic humanism in morals and m.ithematical
determinism in the world of science. Both are possible the moment
one realizes that determinism does not mean predeterimnisui. th;i'
determinism means nothing more than the act of the human mind
in organizing objectively and mathematically the external world int''"
a system.
Is this subjectivism of the type of pragmatism?
"This might be true if before perception and before the universe
humanity was already something entirely given and entirely devel-
oped, in such a way that by starting with this complete notion of
man and by defining the structure of his sensibility and intellect,
perception and science would be explained, as subjective sxntheses
'^^Lcs Aiomes, Paris, Alcan, 1913, p. 291. Cf. Brunschvicg, p. 392.
'^^L'Exper. Hum., p. 570.
346 THE OPEN COURT
Now ... if sucli is indeed the concej)tion which reaHsm forms of
ideahsm in order to bolster up its polemic, it is far from the verif-
able interpretation of idealism, at least since the advent of modern
psychologn>' and critical reflexion. Man is not known before the uni
verse; we do not know ourselves as individuals occupying^ a porlion
of space and living in time except after having organized—except
through organizing—our visual and tactual impressions in such a
manner as to give us a plurality of mobile objects across the suc-
cession of decorations which dominate our horizon ; and we take cog-
nizance of ourselves as being objects among objects. If we did not
succeed in putting a reasonable order in the world surrounding us, we
should not become ourselves, for ourselves, reasonable beings.
According to the expression of Jules Lachelier: 'Incoherence out-
side is madness inside'." ^-
Because reason has grown out of experience and has been refined
by experience gives no license to the pragmatic fallacv of regarding
experience as an absolute. Brute experience is by itself a nega-
tion, a point of resistance, which becomes significant only when it
is transformed into an intellectual point of departure. So, too. the
moral philosophy of action which has been so largely encouraged by
pragmatism reveals itself as an inadequate guide precisely because
it emphasizes the wrong phase of the human dialectical process.
"The Stoics used to say that just as it often happens that a man
who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly
than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like
manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first intro-
duced to Wisdom by the primary impulses of Nature, afterwards
Wisdom itself becomes dearer than are the impulses by which we
came to her." ^^
As one beholds M. Brunschvicg's remarkable efi'ort at philo-
sophic synthesis, one begins to realize the growing complexity of
modern thought, a complexity to M'hich the doctrinaire schools of
philosophy pay little heed. The problem is not so simple as realism
vs. idealism, any more than the problem of political government in
America is exhausted by the alternative of the Republican or Demo-
cratic parties. Nor is the practical solution of pragmatism of much
use to the student who is interested in understanding reality in all
its refinement and subtlety.
There is indeed no alternative than to study each phase of mod-
ern thought in its historical becoming. It is a task requiring ency-
clopedic knowledge and more than that, the artist's power of creative
synthesis. For the philosopher, too, is an artist, having in his charge
the continual remoulding of the intellectual and moral consciences
of humanity.
i2/fe,rf., p. 610.
''Cicero, De finihus, III, 7. Cf. Brunschvicg, p. 614.
